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RICO Pretrial Restraints and Due Process:
The Lessons of Princeton/Newport
Bruce A. Baird*
Carolyn P. Vinson**
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") ' has changed the federal legal landscape in a number of ways.
One significant area of innovation has been RICO's use of forfeiture as a
penalty for RICO criminal offenses. Although forfeiture has deep histor-
ical roots as a legal sanction, 2 in recent American legal history the use of
* Of Counsel, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. The author was Chief of the Securities
and Commodities Frauds Unit in the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York and was in charge of the post-indictment forfeiture hearing proceedings in the Princeton!
Newport case.
** Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2 The concept of forfeiture can be traced to ancient Greece and Rome, as well as toJudaic law.
See 1 S. SCOTT, THE CIVIL .Aw 69 (1932) (Roman law circa 471 B.C. providing: "If a quadruped
causes injury to anyone, let the owner tender him the estimated amount of the damage; and if he is
unwilling to accept it, the owner shall.. surrender the animal that caused the injury."); O.W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7-17 (1881) (Greek law circa 389-314 B.C. providing "[W]e banish be-
yond our borders st[i]cks and stones and steel, voiceless and mindless things, if they chance to kill a
man; and if a man commits suicide, bury the hand that struck the blow afar from the body... Id at
8.); see also I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 301. See generally Finkelstein, The Gorring Ox: Some
Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEM-
PLE L.Q. 160 (1973). Chapter 21 of Exodus reveals the religious origins of forfeiture: "If an ox gore
a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten;
but the owner of the ox shall be quit." Exodus 21:28. Punishment was not inflicted upon the owner of
the ox unless the owner had knowledge that the ox was "wont to push his horn in time past." Deuter-
onomy 19:5-6. Medieval Britons also recognized the concept of forfeiture, which was passed down to
the English common law. O.W. HOLMES, supra, at 24-26 (" 'Where a man killeth another with the
sword ofJohn at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner."' Id
at 25 (citing DOCTOR AND STUDENT dialogue 2, ch. 51 (n.p. n.d.) (circa 1530))).
The origins of United States forfeiture provisions are found in the common law of early eight-
eenth century England, which provided for three types of forfeiture: deodand, statutory or in rem
forfeiture, and forfeiture consequent to attainder or in personam forfeiture. See generally 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, supra, at * 380-89; O.W. HOLMES, supra, at 5-33.
The first, deodand, provided for the forfeiture of the instrument of a man's death, irrespective
of the guilt or innocence of the owner of the instrumentality. See O.W. HOLMES, supra, at 24-25.
Deodand was never adopted in the United States, see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 682-83 (1974); State v. Richard, 301 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. 1957) (describing deo-
dand as "repugnant to the American concept ofjustice"), and was abolished in England in 1846; see
Note, Criminal Forfeitures and the Necessity for a Post-Seizure Hearing: Are CCE and RICO Rackets for the
Goverment?, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 776, 782 n.28 (1983) (citing An Act to Abolish Deodands, 1846, 9
& 10 Vict., ch. 62 (1846)). Nonetheless, the influences of deodand can be found in United States
decisional law. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1921) (recognizing
deodand as the predecessor of United States forfeiture statutes and describing a car as "guilty"); see
also United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612) (anthropo-
morphosis of a ship).
The second, statutory forfeiture, typically took place in the context of violations of customs,
revenue and admiralty laws, which provided for in rem proceedings for the forfeiture of objects used
in the underlying offense. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at * 261-62; see CJ. Hendrey Co. v. Moore, 318
U.S. 133, 137-42 (1943). Statutory forfeiture became part of American jurisprudence and in rem
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in personam forfeiture has been rare.3 By including forfeiture provisions
in RICO, Congress provided for a mechanism to eliminate the prdfitabil-
ity of crime. With the possibility of such forfeiture came a provision in
the statute for bonds, restraints, or similar devices to be imposed by a
court to ensure that property sought to be forfeited would still be avail-
able at the time of verdict. The RICO statute was originally silent as to
the procedures required in connection with the imposition of such pre-
judgment restraints, but in 1984 it was amended to eliminate the neces-
sity for any procedures after an indictment issued.
This article will examine the requirements of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution with respect to
RICO pre-judgment restraining orders and will propose that in a narrow
group of cases involving restraints on operating business entities a hear-
ing on the reasonableness of the restraint is required before such a re-
straint can be imposed. Specifically, Part I of this Article discusses the
due process law applicable to pre-judgment takings of property. Part II
describes the restraints allowed by the RICO statute before and after the
1984 amendments and the judicial responses to the statute. Part III ex-
amines the recent Princeton/Newport case 4 in which RICO restraints were
imposed on an operating business entity. Part IV proposes a set of proce-
dures consistent with the due process clause for handling similar cases in
the future. Drawing support from both general due process principles
and Princeton/Newport, this Article posits an exception to the usual crimi-
nal forfeiture rule of "sentence first-verdict afterward" 5 when a pro-
posed forfeiture involves an operating business entity.
proceedings have been frequent means of achieving forfeiture in the United States. Calero-Toledo,
416 U.S. at 682-83.
The third, in personam forfeiture, is the historical antecedent of the forfeiture remedy provided
for in RICO. Upon conviction of treason or a felony, the defendant was subject to attainder, which
resulted in the "extinction of his civil rights and capacities." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at * 389.
Conviction thus resulted in the immediate forfeiture of all of the defendant's personal property, and
upon his death, of his real property. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at * 387, 385; 2 J. KENT, COMMENTA-
RIES ON AMERICAN LAW 504-05 (10th ed. 1980). Conviction constituted a "corruption of blood,"
precluding not only inheritance by him but also precluding his heirs from inheriting through him. 4
W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at * 388; see United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980). In personam forfeiture rested on the belief that "all property is derived
from society" so that transgression of the social contract results in forfeiture of the right to the
privileges afforded by that contract. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra, at * 299.
3 Forfeiture consequent to attainder, or in personam forfeiture, rejected by the framers of the
Constitution, was prohibited in the United States Constitution, and by an act of the First Congress in
1790. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. III, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (1790) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563
(1988)) ("No conviction or judgment shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate.")
(repealed as of Nov. 1, 1986, P.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)). In personam forfeiture was
repugnant to the founders because of the profound effect of forfeiture on the criminal's family and
heirs, because his entire estate was forfeited upon conviction of treason or a felony, and was subse-
quently abolished by statute in England, as well. See K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILrrY
§ 7:21 & n.427 (1984) (citing 54 Geo. 3, ch. 45 (1814); 33 & 34 Vic. ch.23 (1870)). See generally Note,
Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished At Last? 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768 (1977).
4 Princeton/Newport produced four reported district court opinions written by Judge Carter, each
entitled United States v. Regan. The citations are: 726 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 713 F. Supp.
629 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 706 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); and 699 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
5 L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 161 (M. Gardner ed. 1960).
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I. Due Process and Pre-Judgment Takings of Property
The rule, enshrined in our Constitution to protect citizens from the
despotic power of any state, is that no one may be deprived of property
without due process of law. The concepts of "property" and "due pro-
cess of law" have each been the subject of definition and redefinition
throughout American history. The requirements of due process "reflect[]
the high value embedded in our constitutional and political history that
we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of governmental
interference."
6
It is well established that temporary deprivations of property, such
as those resulting from the entry of a restraining order, are deprivations
of "property" within the meaning of this rule.7 "Due process of law"
means at least that there must be notice to the property owner and an
opportunity to be heard within a "meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."'8 Ordinarily, that meaningful time is prior to the deprivation of
property.9 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that extraordi-
nary circumstances may warrant the postponement of a hearing until af-
ter the restraint is in place. 10 Such a truly unusual situation may arise
when three criteria are met:
(1) The seizure is directly necessary to secure an important govern-
mental or general public interest;
(2) There exists a special need for prompt action; and
(3) The person initiating the deprivation is a governmental official re-
sponsible for determining the necessity and justification of the
seizure. 1
Extraordinary circumstances are often found in criminal cases, for
example, when property is seized as contraband or pursuant to search
warrant.' 2 They also arise when important governmental and general
public interests are at stake, such as in the case of property seized to aid
in war efforts, to protect against bank failures, to prevent misbranded
drugs from reaching the market where seizure is pursuant to an in rem
6 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (citation omitted).
7 Id at 84-85 (1972) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Sniadach v. Fam-
ily Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339-42 (1969); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601, 606 (1975); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); see United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040, 1086 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (stating that it is a "well-recognized requirement of Fifth Amendment due process that some
kind of hearing be afforded when there is a 'taking' or 'deprivation' of property"), af,'d, 789 F.2d
1492 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 855 (1986); see also United States v. Serafine, 889 F.2d
1258, 1264 (2d Cir. 1989); Note, RICO Post-Indictment Restraining Orders: The Process Due Defendants, 60
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1162, 1154 (1985). See generally Note, Supreme Court Upholds Forfeiture of Innocent Owners
Property Without Prior Notice and Hearing, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 467 (1975).
8 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39-40
(1972).
9 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848 (1977).
10 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-92; Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339. A "root requirement" of due process is
the right to a hearing before being deprived of a significant property interest unless the government
demonstrates "some valid governmental interest... that justifies postponing the hearing until after
the event." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (footnote omitted).
11 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
12 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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forfeiture.13 A restraining order for the purpose of preserving property
for subsequent forfeiture, however, is not automatically an extraordinary
circumstance.14
Due process also requires the opportunity to be heard to be mean-
ingful in manner.15 In Mathews v. Eldridge,16 the Supreme Court enunci-
ated three factors to be balanced in order to identify "the specific dictates
of due process": (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the prob-
able value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens an additional procedural requirement would en-
tail.' 7 This balancing test must be applied when an opportunity to be
heard is given in order to determine whether a restraining order to pre-
serve property for subsequent forfeiture comports with due process
requirements.
II. RICO Restraint Procedures and Judicial Response
A. The 1970 Legislation
In 1970, the Ninety-First Congress reached back into history18 to
enact in personam forfeiture provisions as part of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),' 9 and in its narcotics anal-
ogy, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act. 20 Congress
gave the government this powerful remedy as one weapon in its efforts to
fight organized crime by "removing the leaders of organized crime from
their sources of economic power," 2 1 and eliminating the profitability of
13 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91-92; Note, supra note 2, at 794 & nn. 102-105.
14 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678-79; United States v. Serafine, 889 F.2d 1258, 1263-64 (2d Cir.
1989). But see United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (1Ith Cir. 1986)
("seizure for the purposes of forfeiture presents an extraordinary situation," citing Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 679-80).
15 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
16 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
17 Id. at 335.
18 Congress may have thought this concept had lain unused for 200 years. S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1969). See 116 CONG. REC. 35,193 (Rep. Poff), 18,939 (Sen. McClellan). In
fact, it was sporadically used in the 19th century in the context of the Civil War. Bigelow v. Forrest,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869) (upholding the constitutionality of in personam forfeiture against Con-
federate soldiers); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870) (same). See generally, Note,
supra note 3.
19 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941-44 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1988)).
20 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
21 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969). See 116 CONG. REC. 511, 592 (Sen. McClel-
lan) ("Title IX... would forfeit the ill-gotten gains of criminals whether they enter or operate an
organization through a pattern of racketeering activity."), 602 (Sen. Hruska) ("Title IX of this act is
designed to remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business by attacking its prop-
erty interests and by removing its members from control of legitimate businesses which have been
acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering methods.") For an extensive discussion of the legisla-
tive history of the original RICO forfeiture provisions, see generally, Spaulding, "Hit Them Where it




crime. Two years later, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were
amended to govern criminal forfeitures. 2
2
With the possibility of forfeiture of proceeds of racketeering activ-
ity23 of any direct or indirect interest in the RICO enterprise (even a
legitimate one),24 came the problem of defendants putting these forfeita-
ble assets beyond the reach of the law before the end of the trial. In order
to prevent the dissipation or diversion of assets potentially subject to for-
feiture by a person indicted under RICO, the 1970 Act enabled the gov-
ernment to seek ex parte restraining orders against forfeitable property
prior to trial.25
In general, following the issuance of a grand jury indictment alleging
a RICO violation and specifying the property subject to forfeiture,26 the
government moved ex parte for a restraining order.27 The entry of such
a restraining order was designed to preserve the property subject to for-
feiture by preventing the defendant from disposing of the property sub-
ject to the order-whether by sale, transfer, encumbrance or any other
method-until the final resolution of the underlying criminal case.28
Upon the entry of a guilty verdict, a special verdict 29 listing the property
subject to forfeiture would authorize the forfeiture of such property.30
RICO, as originally enacted, contained no provision for the proce-
dures to be followed by district courts in entertaining requests by the
government for post-indictment restraining orders.3 ' Indeed, the legis-
lative history of the original enactment reflects no discussion of the nec-
essary procedures governing post-indictment restraining orders.
Although the indictment itself provided notice that the property in ques-
22 FED. R. C~am. P. 7(c)(2), 31(e), 32(b)(2), 54(b)(5). Prior to that time, the Rules made no provi-
sion for criminal forfeiture as traditionally forfeiture was civil or in rem in nature. See Note, supra
note 3 at 769.
23 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1988).
24 Id
25 The statute provided:
A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon application of
the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when information or indict-
ment has not been filed with respect to the property, if the United States demonstrates that
there is probable cause to believe that the property.., would, in the event of conviction, be
subject to forfeiture under this section and that the provision of notice will jeopardize the
availability of the property for forfeiture.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) (1988).
26 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(c)(2) (providing that criminal forfeiture may only ensue when the in-
dictment identifies the property subject to forfeiture).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Spiotro, 680 F.2d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Veon,
538 F. Supp. 237, 240 (E.D. Cal. 1982). See also Note, supra note 2, at 796 ("Such a motion is made
upon an ex parte demonstration of evidence or merely by governmental request.").
28 See, e.g., Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 614 (order restraining defendant from "disposing of any title to,
assets of, or interest in [his jewelry store] during the pendency of the proceedings under a RICO
indictment") (footnote omitted); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723,.724 (S.D. Cal. 1979)
(order restraining defendant from "selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of or encumbering"
his residence or business assets during the pendency of criminal proceedings). But see United States
v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md. 1976) (denying motion for restraining order on grounds
that it would constitute a pretrial determination of guilt), aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part,
591 F.2d 1347, aff'd 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
29 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(e) (providing for special verdicts to be returned to the extent of the
property subject to forfeiture).
30 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b)(2).
31 See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 943 (1970).
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tion was subject to forfeiture, no provision was made for the defendant
to be heard in challenge to the restraining order, nor did the defendant
have any opportunity to expedite the trial in the underlying criminal mat-
ter in order to have the matter of the restraint on property finally re-
solved. The statute contemplated that the defendant would be deprived
of control over his property until the jury rendered its verdict.5 2
B. The Original Judicial Response
Although the statute provided no guidance to the courts on the pro-
cedure for entering post-indictment restraining orders, the overwhelm-
ing majority of courts faced with the issue ruled that due process
requirements entitled RICO defendants to a post-restraint adversarial
hearing on the propriety of a restraining order.33 Most of these decisions
relied upon precedents in creditor's remedies cases34 or upon the proce-
dures governing civil restraints.3 5 The courts differed on what kind of
evidence would be entertained in such a hearing,3 6 and the government's
burden necessary to sustain a restraining order.37 But the courts uni-
formly did not require the hearing to be held prior to issuing the re-
straining order because they found that certain extraordinary
circumstances involving compelling governmental interest warranted
postponement of the hearing until after the restraint was in place.
38
These cases involved analysis of a black or white question: Is the prop-
erty in question subject to forfeiture?
In these post-deprivation hearings, the courts generally required the
government to establish two things: that it was probable that ajury would
(1) convict the defendant of RICO violations, and (2) find the property
specified in the indictment subject to forfeiture under RICO.3 9 The gov-
ernment was required to produce evidence to enable the district court to
32 United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 468 U.S.
1206 (1984).
33 See, e.g., Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 616-18; Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1297-98 (indictment alleged violation
of CCE statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988)); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3rd Cir. 1981)
(same); Harvey, 560 F. Supp. at 1083-86 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (same); see also United States v. Beckham,
562 F. Supp. 488, 489-90 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 243-45; Mandel, 408 F. Supp. at
682.
34 In the context of civil forfeiture, the Supreme Court has held that, at a minimum, due process
requires a post-deprivation hearing. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972) (replevin); Snia-
dach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339-42 (1962) (garnishment).
35 FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (requiring an immediate hearing after the entry of an cc parte restraining
order in a civil matter). See United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1325 (8th Cir. 1985); Spilotro, 680
F.2d at 617.
36 Compare Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 619 n.4 with Harvey, 560 F. Supp. at 1087-88.
37 Compare Harvey, 560 F. Supp. at 1087-88 (preponderance of the evidence) with United States v.
Veliotis, 588 F. Supp. 1512, 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (probable cause) and Beckham, 562 F. Supp. at 490
(clear and convincing evidence).
38 See Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90); Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678-79.
See generally Note, supra note 2, at 794.
39 See Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 618; Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1298; Long, 654 F.2d at 915; Harvey, 560 F.
Supp. at 1085; Veon, 538 F. Supp. at 246; Mandel, 408 F. Supp. at 682-83; see also Beckham, 562 F.
Supp. at 490 (adding a clear and convincing evidence standard and requiring the government to
show it had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant would likely dispose of the property prior
to trial).
[Vol. 65:1009
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determine whether the government's burden was met; the indictment
alone would not suffice.
40
C. The 1984 Amendments
In 1984, Congress amended the forfeiture provisions in RICO, sig-
nificantly broadening the authority of district courts to issue pre-trial re-
straining orders and clarifying the pre-trial restraining order provisions
by providing for both pre-indictment and post-indictment restraints. 41
The amendments to RICO grew out of Congress's disappointment with
the government's 'record of obtaining forfeitures42 and disapproval of
court decisions hindering the government's ability to obtain post-indict-
40 See Mandel, 408 F. Supp. at 683; Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 618; Long, 654 F.2d at 915; see also Crozier,
674 F.2d at 1297-98 (requiring compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence in post deprivation
hearings). Contra Harvey, 560 F. Supp. at 1087-88 (holding as inapplicable the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
41 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d) (Supp. 1990). The statute provides:
(d)(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other ac-
tion to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture under
this section-
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would,
in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section; or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if, after notice to persons ap-
pearing to have an interest in the property and opportunity for a hearing, the court deter-
mines that-
(i) there is substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of forfei-
ture and that failure to enter the order will result in the property being destroyed, removed
from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for the forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the requested
order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered:
Provided, however, that an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be effective
for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown or unless
an indictment or information described in subparagraph (A) has been filed.
(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon application
of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an information or
indictment has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United States demon-
strates that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the
order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section
and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property more than ten
days after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for good cause shown or unless
the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period. A hearing
requested concerning an order entered under this paragraph shall be held at the earliest
possible time, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
(3) The court may receive and consider, at a hearing held pursuant to this subsection, evi-
dence and information that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Ia. As part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act also
amended, in substantially identical fashion, the forfeiture provision of the Continuing Criminal En-
terprise Act. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
42 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 194, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3377. The General Accounting Office reported in 1981 that only ninety-eight CCE and
RICO cases, involving two million dollars of potentially forfeitable assets, were brought between
1970 and 1980. GENERAL ACCOUNnNG OFFICE, Assar FORFErrRE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COM-
BATrING DRUG TRAFFICKING ii (1981). By contrast, drug traffickers generated approximately sixty
billion dollars annually during that time frame. Id. at i. A stated purpose of the statute was to en-
hance the use of forfeiture, particularly in a criminal context, as a "law enforcement tool in combat-
ting two of the most serious crime problems facing the country: racketeering and drug trafficking."
S. REP. No. 225, supra, at 191, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3374.
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ment restraining orders. 43 The inability of the government to prevent
the transfer of potentially forfeitable property (and to obtain any such
property once it had been transferred) was identified as the most signifi-
cant shortcoming of the 1970 forfeiture provisions in a series of congres-
sional hearings investigating the use of criminal forfeiture procedures. 44
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 "expanded the sub-
stantive sweep of criminal forfeiture," by increasing the number of fed-
eral offenses subject to criminal forfeiture to include an estimated
twenty-five percent of federal criminal cases, including all federal drug
felonies. 45 The 1984 amendments included a relation back provision.
46
Thus, the government's interest in the property to be forfeited vests at
the time the crime is committed, rather than upon conviction, as had pre-
viously been the case.
Unlike the original enactment, the 1984 amendments confer juris-
diction on district courts, upon application of the government, to enter
restraining orders and injunctions, to require the execution of a perform-
ance bond, or to take any other action, with the stated purpose of pre-
serving the availability of the property for forfeiture.47 Just as in the
original enactment, the statute purposefully makes no provision for no-
tice or hearing in a post-indictment setting.48 All that is required by the
plain language of the statute is an indictment or information charging a
43 The Senate Report states:
Although current law does authorize the issuance of restraining orders in the post-indict-
ment period, neither the RICO nor CCE statute articulates any standard for the issuance of
these orders. Certain recent court decisions have required the government to meet essen-
tially the same stringent standard that applies to the issuance of temporary restraining or-
ders in the context of civil litigation and have also held the Federal Rules of Evidence to
apply to hearings concerning restraining orders in criminal forfeiture cases. In effect, such
decisions allow the courts to entertain challenges to the validity of the indictment, and re-
quire the government to prove the merits of the underlying criminal case and forfeiture
counts and put on its witnesses well in advance of trial in order to obtain an order re-
straining the defendant's transfer of property alleged to be forfeitable in the indictment.
Meeting such requirements can make obtaining a restraining order-the sole means avail-
able to the government to assure the availability of assets after conviction-quite difficult.
In addition, these requirements may make pursuing a restraining order inadvisable from
the prosecutor's point of view because of the potential for damaging premature disclosure
of the government's case and trial strategy for jeopardizing the safety of witnesses and vic-
tims in racketeering and narcotics trafficking cases who would be required to testify at the
restraining order hearing.
Id. at 195-96, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3378-79 (footnote omitted). The legislative
history indicates that Congress believed pre-trial restraints to be necessary because "a person who
anticipates that some of his property may be subject to forfeiture has not only an obvious incentive,
but also ample opportunity to transfer his assets or remove them from the jurisdiction of the court
prior to trial and so shield them from any possibility of forfeiture." Id at 195, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 3378. The Senate Report notes that even if the government is able to restrain the
property, contempt is the only sanction in the event that the defendant defies the restraining order.
Id., 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3378.
44 United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988).
45 Id
46 "All right, title and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section...." 21
U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988).
47 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1) (1988).
48 Id § 1963(d)(1)(A).
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RICO violation and alleging that specified property is subject to
forfeiture.4 9
In the case of a restraint sought prior to indictment, however, Con-
gress provided specific guidelines that district courts should follow in ex-
ercising their statutory jurisdiction. 50 In the pre-indictment setting, the
statute requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing be given to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the property and sets out a test
to be met which is patterned after the civil standards for injunctive re-
lief.51 In the context of a post-indictment restraining order, however, the
Senate Committee Report rejected both the civil temporary restraining
order standard employed by some courts and particularly that prong of
the Rule 65 standard requiring a showing of the government's likelihood
of success on the merits of the criminal prosecution. 52 As far as Con-
gress was concerned, the probable cause established in the indictment or
information served as a sufficient basis for the restraining order to is-
sue.58 Congress would allow the court to "consider factors bearing on
the reasonableness of the order sought," 54 but prohibited any attempt to
"look behind" the indictment or require additional evidence regarding
the merits of the case. 55
Because an arrest warrant may issue upon the filing of an indictment
or information, the Committee Report asserts that a similarly sufficient
basis existed for a restraint upon the defendant's ability to transfer or
remove property subject to forfeiture in the indictment.56 The Senate
Report specifically states that a post-indictment restraining order does
49 Id.
50 Id. § 1963(d)(i)(B).
51 Id The statute calls for a three-part test by the issuing court:
1) Whether there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue
of forfeiture;
2) Whether the absence of restraint will result in the property being made unavailable for
forfeiture; and
3) Whether the need to preserve the availability of the property out-weights the hardship
on any party against whom the order is to be entered.
Id Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 65. A pre-indictment restraining order remains in force for ninety (90)
days, unless an indictment issues or the court extends it for good cause shown. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(d)(1)(B) (1988).
Also available to the government in a pre-indictment setting is an emergency temporary re-
straining order, without notice or opportunity to be heard given to interested parties. Id
§ 1963(d)(2). To obtain such a restraining order the government must demonstrate that probable
cause exists to believe that: 1) the property is subject to forfeiture; and 2) prior to notice to inter-
ested parties wouldjeopardize the future availability of the property for forfeiture. Id In the absence
of consent of the affected parties or good cause shown, this type of restraining order expires in ten
(10) days. Id. If the affected parties request a hearing concerning the emergency order, it must be
held expediently and prior to the end of the ten (10) day period. Id
52 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195-96 (1984). reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3382-79. See also S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 18 (1983). For an extensive
discussion of the legislative history of the 1984 amendments, see generally, Spaulding, supra note 21,
at 234-44.
53 S. REP. No. 225,98th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs at 3385.
54 Id (emphasis added).
55 Id
56 Id at 203, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3386.
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not require prior notice and opportunity for a hearing. 57 Congress did
not prohibit courts from holding a hearing after the entry of the re-
straining order, at which time the court may modify or vacate an order
that is clearly improper. 58 Nonetheless, it is clear that Congress deter-
mined that such a challenge could not reach the indictment itself.59
D. The Judicial Response to the 1984 Amendments
The majority of courts considering post-indictment restraining or-
ders since the 1984 amendments have required adversarial hearings.
Only three courts have found no denial of due process in the issuance of
post-indictment restraining orders as contemplated in the statute and its
legislative history.60 In general, the majority of courts have not diverged
from the analysis of decisions concerning RICO as originally enacted. 61
Some courts have upheld the statute but ignored the legislative history,
stubbornly importing the standards of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
on temporary restraining orders into the post-indictment restraining or-
der provision.62 Other courts-recognizing the lack of legislative intent
for requiring a hearing on post-indictment restraining orders-have held
the restraining order provisions unconstitutional.
6 3
57 Id. "The indictment or information itself gives notice of the government's intent to seek a
forfeiture of the property. Moreover, the necessity of quickly obtaining a restraining order after
indictment in the criminal forfeiture context presents exigencies not present when restraining orders
are sought in the ordinary civil context." Id
58 Id. Congress' example of a clearly improper restraint is one on property not specified in the
underlying indictment. Id.
59 Id "For the purposes of issuing a restraining order, the probable cause established in the
indictment or information is to be determinative of any issue regarding the merits of the govern-
ment's case on which the forfeiture is based." Ia
60 United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that reliance of the
district court on the indictment in issuing a restraining order comported with due process); United
States v. Keller, 730 F. Supp. 151, 162-63 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482,
485 (S.D. Ala. 1986) ("A blanket assertion that the failure of 21 U.S.C. § 853 to require a prompt
post-seizure hearing must render the statute unconstitutional irrespective of the particular facts in-
volved is clearly contrary to the concept of flexibility espoused by the Supreme Court.") (footnote
omitted).
61 See supra notes 32-41.
62 See United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987)
(holding that the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 apply to all restraining orders and injunctions
issued by U.S. courts, including RICO post-indictment restraining orders and requiring a hearing to
be held within ten days of issuance); United States v. Perholtz, 622 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D.D.C.
1985) ("The United States cannot obtain a permanent restraining order that prevents a defendant
from disposing of his property by means of an exparte proceeding. Due process requires that such an
order be temporary and the United States must give the affected defendants notice of a hearing
within a brief amount of time or the exparte order expires."); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
1332 (D. Colo. 1985); see also Spaulding, supra note 21, at 269.
63 See United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 929 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding the provision in viola-
tion of Fifth Amendment due process guarantees to the extent that RICO "authorizes the issuance
ofexparte restraining orders after indictment without any post-deprivation hearing other than a crim-
inal trial"), modified, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2546 (1989); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 1729 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding the statutory scheme in violation of the due process clause in that it allows no oppor-




1. No Hearing Required
In United States v. Musson,64 the government moved for a restraining
order three days after filing the indictment under both RICO and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,6 5 to protect the
government's interest in property alleged to be subject to forfeiture in
the event of a criminal conviction. On the basis of the indictment, which
alleged that certain real property and personalty were subject to forfei-
ture, the district court issued a restraining order. The restraining order
required notice to the government and court approval if the defendant
sought to sell or transfer the restrained property.
A pre-trial hearing was held at which the defendant mounted a
three-part attack on: 1) the impact of the order on interested third par-
ties; 2) the failure of the indictment to describe the nexus between the
illegal acts alleged and the restrained property; and 3) the inclusion in
the restraining order of certain property that defendants claimed were
exempt. 66 The district court rejected all three arguments of the
defendant.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of the district court's action.67 Defendants
argued that they were entitled to an evidentiary hearing in which the gov-
ernment had to demonstrate through factual submissions "a reasonable
probability that forfeiture will be ultimately obtained," and that compli-
ance with the requirements of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure was necessary.68
Reviewing the legislative history, the Musson court found it apparent
that Congress required a hearing of the nature proposed by defendants
to be held only when the government sought a restraining order prior to
an indictment.69 The court stated that an indictment has long been rec-
ognized as sufficient probable cause for an immediate arrest. According
to the Musson court, the RICO forfeiture provisions added another ele-
ment to the determination of probable cause by a grand jury: the grand
jury must determine that the described property is subject to forfeiture if
certain statutory provisions are applicable.70 The Tenth Circuit found
no serious problem with placing such a determination within the func-
tions of a grandjury.7 1 The court concluded that, based upon the legis-
lative history and the plain language of the statute, Congress intended
that the probable cause determination of the grand jury to include forfei-
ture in the indictment was sufficient to support the issuance of the re-
straining order.72 The court based its conclusion on the assumption that
64 802 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1986).
65 18 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
66 802 F.2d at 385.
67 Id at 387.
68 Id ar 385.
69 Id at 386.
70 Id
71 Id.
72 Id. at 387.
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the grand jury received evidence to support its probable cause determi-
nation on the forfeitability of the property.
On the question of whether the defendants had been denied proce-
dural due process, the Musson court suggested that a restraint on prop-
erty is far less intrusive than a physical seizure of property.73 The court
cited the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin 74 for the proposition that
due process allows the physical seizure of property without a prior hear-
ing where prompt action is necessary to secure an important government
interest. It further relied upon Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ,75
which upheld a seizure on the basis of probable cause in the absence of a
hearing, stating that "with such benchmarks we cannot conclude that the
reliance of the district court upon the grand jury indictment in issuing a
restraining order which restricted free alienation of the subject property
failed to comport with due process."' 7
6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ala-
bama has also upheld the issuance of a restraining order on the basis of
an indictment. In United States v. Draine,77 the United States obtained an
indictment under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act and an order authorizing the United States Marshal to restrain
$11,400 that had been seized by the State of Alabama pursuant to as
search warrant. 78 In analyzing the due process issue raised by the de-
fendant, the district court applied the balancing test developed by the
Supreme Court in Baker v. Wingo 79 in the context of a speedy trial chal-
lenge. The factors to be weighed in the Wingo test are: 1) the length of
the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) whether defendant has re-
quested a hearing; and 4) whether any prejudice to the defendant can be
traced to the delay.80 The court attributed the bulk of any relevant delay
in the instant case to the defendant, who had moved for continuance of
his trial on two occasions. 8' The court refused to address whether the
defendant had been prejudiced by the restraining order.82 The Draine
court stated that "a blanket assertion that the failure of 21 U.S.C. § 853
to require a prompt post-seizure hearing must render the statute uncon-
stitutional irrespective of the particular facts involved is dearly contrary
to the concept of flexibility espoused by the Supreme Court."83 The
court asserted that trial would provide the defendant with an opportunity
to rebut the presumptions that the money was acquired during the pe-
riod of the violation and that no other likely source for the money
existed. 84
73 Id.
74 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972).
75 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
76 802 F.2d at 387.
77 637 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
78 Id. at 483-85.
79 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
80 Id. at 530.
81 637 F. Supp. at 485.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 It at 486.
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Very recently, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois denied a motion to vacate a restraining order that pre-
vented defendants from selling their interests in currency exchanges. In
United States v. Keller 8 5 defendants argued, inter alia, that the pre-trial re-
straining order should be vacated on grounds that due process required
a pre-trial hearing before that order was entered. The court stated that
"[t]he government correctly argues that the statute does not require a
hearing."8' 6 The court also found that the indictment alone was an insuf-
ficient basis for permitting the continued restraint on property by way of
an ex parte pre-trial restraining order.8 7 The court adopted the balanc-
ing test enunciated in United States v. Harvey,88 which weighs the risk of
erroneous deprivation, the government's interest in providing specific
procedures and the strength of the individual's interest. Since the de-
fendants failed to argue any particular harm caused by the restraining
order, the court concluded that a showing of probable cause, that the
defendants committed the alleged crime and that the restrained property
was forfeitable would suffice.8 9 Although the court found that a grand
jury's finding of probable cause was not conclusive, it held that no evi-
dentiary hearing was necessary because defendants had pointed to no
material factual dispute as to the existence of probable cause.90
2. Hearing Required
In United States v. Thier,91 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a hearing following the form of the traditional re-
quirements of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for re-
straining orders was "an appropriate outline for the government's
burden" in seeking a post-indictment restraining order.92 In reaching its
decision, the court flagrantly disregarded key portions of the legislative
history of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.
The Thier court found the statute to be silent as to the durational
limits of a post-indictment restraining order and as to notice and hearing
requirements, which the court noted was in contrast to the procedures
enunciated for pre-indictment restraining order.9 3 The court deter-
mined that it need not consider the constitutionality of the provision gov-
erning post-indictment restraining orders because the statute did not on
"its face nor by necessary implication bar minimum due process
protections." 94
The Thier court posited that the requirements of Rule 65 apply to
the issuance of all restraining orders and injunctions issued by courts of
85 730 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
86 Id. at 162.
87 Id (citations omitted).
88 814 F.2d at 928. See infra text accompanying notes 128-37.
89 730 F. Supp. at 162.
90 Ide
91 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986) (concerning 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988), the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act).
92 Id at 1470.
93 Id at 1467.
94 l at 1468.
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the United States.95 The court then suggested that the requirements of
Rule 65 were not excluded from the statute, and as such, those require-
ments would apply to the post-indictment restraining orders. 96 The
court concluded that with the procedures of Rule 65, the statute com-
ports with due process.97
Applying the civil standards for injunctive relief to the case at issue,
the Thier court found that the irreparable loss requirement was satisfied
by the exigencies of the post-indictment context. The court stated that
the indictment itself constituted a "strong" but "not irrefutable" show-
ing for injunctive relief.98 The court held that a hearing on modification
of a restraining order must be held within ten days. 99 Acknowledging
that portion of the Act's legislative history which admonished the court
not to look behind the indictment or require the government to prove
the merits of its case,100 the court suggested that Rule 65 would only give
the defendant an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way and at a
meaningful time, before he is denied the present use of property that
may not prove forfeitable. 10 1 "The court is not free to question whether
the grand jury should have acted as it did, but is free, and indeed re-
quired, to exercise its discretion as to whether and to what extent to en-
join based on all matters developed at the hearing." 10 2
The Thier court acknowledged the admonishment in the legislative
history, yet ignored the fact that Congress clearly rejected the Rule 65
standard. The Senate Report criticized "recent court decisions [requir-
ing] the government to meet essentially the same stringent standard that
applies to the issuance of temporary restraining orders in the context of
civil litigation."'' 0 3 The legislative history clearly establishes congres-
sional intent to reject the Rule 65 standard. Essentially, the Thier court
reached its decision without giving full attention to the legislative history
of the post-indictment restraining order provision, and based it instead
upon the type of statutory construction that a court could use to import
any requirements into any statute: that the absence of any procedural
requirements did not preclude their imposition.
In United States v. Perholtz,10 4 a district court concluded that the hear-
ing requirements of Rule 65 remain applicable to RICO's provision on
post-indictment restraining orders. The court stated that unless the de-
fendant was given the opportunity to be heard within ten days of the
restraint, the statute violated his right to due process. 0 5 In addition to
the preliminary injunction standard, the court determined that post-in-




98 Id. at 1470.
99 Id.
100 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 53, at 203, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3386.
101 801 F.2d at 1470.
102 Id
103 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 195-96, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3378-79.




indictment restraining orders. 106 In reaching its conclusion, the court
relied upon pre-amendment cases as well as on the case of first impres-
sion on the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.107
The Perholtz court ruled that to obtain a restraining order pending
the outcome of a trial, the government must show that
1) The failure to enter an order will result in the property being de-
stroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court or otherwise made
unavailable for forfeiture; and
2) The need to preserve the property outweighs the hardship that the
order may impose on the party against whom the order is entered.
108
The court found that in those cases in which the underlying offense in-
volves fraudulent and manipulative transactions, the government is enti-
fled to a presumption that negotiable and liquid assets may be made
unavailable for forfeiture if not restrained. 10 9 In the case of non-negotia-
ble assets and real estate, however, the court found that the government
needs to demonstrate more specific evidence that the property may be
made unavailable.' 10
3. Striking Down the Statute as Unconstitutional
In a recent case in which the post-indictment restraining order pro-
vision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970 was reviewed,"' the court held that the statutory scheme, allowing
it no opportunity to place into question the government's allegation that
certain property is subject to forfeiture, violates due process when it re-
sults in preventing the defendant from using the restrained funds to se-
cure the services of his counsel of choice. 112 Although the sixth
amendment issue of right to counsel has now been decided by the
Supreme Court, 1 3 the analysis of the Moya-Gomez court on the due pro-
cess considerations of post-indictment restraining orders is instructive.
At the outset, the court determined that the defendant had suffered
a deprivation of property in a constitutional sense. 114 The court stated:
Although the government's tide is not established definitively until the
entry of ajudgment of conviction, title shifts through the operation of
106 Id at 1259.
107 Id at 1256 (citing United States v. Rogers, 602 F.Supp. 1332, 1342-45 (D. Colo. 1985)).
108 Id at 1259.
109 Id
110 Id
111 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (RICO's narcotics analogy).
112 United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3221
(1989).
113 United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989) (holding that the sixth amendment is not
violated by freezing assets a criminal defendant might use to pay attorneys' fees before conviction if
freeze is based on a finding of probable cause to believe the assets are forfeitable); Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989) (holding that the sixth amendment is not
violated by preventing a criminal defendant from using assets adjudged to be forfeitable to pay
attorneys' fees); see also United States v. Noriega, 1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9099 No. 88-79-CR (S.D. Fla.
June 14, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Current file) (ordering that "a hearing be held at which the
government must demonstrate the likelihood that the [seized] assets . . .are the product of the
defendant's illegal activities").
114 860 F.2d at 725.
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the relation back provision at the time of the commission of the crime.
The restraining order thus operates to remove the assets from the
control of the defendant on the claim of the government that it has a
higher right to those assets. While the restraining order does not
divest definitively, it certainly does remove those assets from his im-
mediate control and therefore divests him of a significant property
interest. 15
The court next turned to the question of whether the method of removal
of the property interest is consonant with the notice and hearing require-
ments of the due process clause. 16
The Moya-Gomez court employed a three-part balancing test enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in determining what process is due:
1) Whether there is a private interest that will be affected by official
government action;
2) Whether there is a risk of erroneous deprivation through the proce-
dures used and what probable value any additional procedural safe-
guards would have; and
3) Whether additional procedural prerequisites would unduly burden
the government interest, including the function involved and official
and administrative burdens."
17
In considering the first factor, the court found that the defendant's pri-
vate interest in retaining counsel of choice to be significant."
8
On the question of erroneous deprivation, the court stated:
The return of an indictment by the grand jury is, no doubt, adequate
notification to the defendant of the pending forfeiture action as part of
the criminal proceeding against him. However, due process requires
that the party who may be deprived of a property right not only be
informed of that possibility but also have an opportunity to
respond. 119
The court correctly found that the statute does not provide for a post-
restraint hearing, stating "it is clear that Congress did not intend that
such a hearing be held. What is... already clear in the text of the statute
is reinforced by the legislative history."' 120 The court then acknowledged
that the case of a seizure pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act, in which the
Supreme Court suggested that the eighteen-month subsequent criminal
trial was an adequate opportunity for defendant to contest the validity of
the seizure, tended to support the proposition that the criminal trial fol-
lowing a post-indictment restraining order was an adequate opportunity
for the defendant to be held. 12 1 Nonetheless, the court found that a dis-
115 Id. at 725-26.
116 Id at 726.
117 Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) and Cleveland Board of Education
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1985)).
118 860 F.2d at 726.
119 Id at 726-27.
120 Id. at 727-28 (citing S. REP. No. 225, supra note 42, at 202-03, 213, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.&
ADMIN. NEWS 3385-86, 3396.
121 Id at 727-28 (citing United States v. § 8850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) (upholding an 18 month
delay between seizure and trial)).
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tinction arises where the defendant needs the frozen assets to make his
case at trial.1
22
The court determined that the statutory scheme presents a great op-
portunity for prosecutorial abuse, permitting the government, merely on
the basis of an ex parte application to a grand jury, to significantly affect
the defendant's ability to participate in the adversary process at his crimi-
nal trial.123 The court stated that "if one party can skew the process to its
advantage, the integrity of the entire process is harmed."
124
As for the government's interest, the court would not "second-
guess" Congress in its conclusion that the magnitude of the threat of
drug trafficking was great.1 25 But the court concluded its balancing of
the three factors by finding that it was of constitutional necessity to afford
the defendant an opportunity to challenge the government's allegation
that certain property is subject to forfeiture.' 26 The court held that a
pre-trial, post-indictment restraint on a defendant's assets without af-
fording the defendant an "immediate post-restraining adversary hearing
at which the government is required to prove the likelihood that the re-
strained assets are subjectto forfeiture" violates the defendant's right to
due process to the extent that it impinges on his qualified sixth amend-
ment right to his counsel of choice.
1 27
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held
that post-indictment, ex parte restraints on property transfers violate
fifth amendment procedural due process rights where "no opportunity
for an early post-restraint hearing is afforded."1 28 The Harvey court cited
with approval three pre-amendment cases holding that neither the indict-
ment itself nor a criminal trial held months after the issuance of an ex
parte restraining order affords the due process guaranteed by the fifth
amendment.
29
The Fourth Circuit relied on the test articulated by the Supreme
Court which balances 1) the risk of erroneous deprivation; 2) the govern-
ment's interest in providing specific procedures; and 3) the strength of
the individual's interest.'3 0 The court stated:
Post-indictment restraining orders of the kind authorized by the Act
and as actually entered in Harvey's case obviously may work a tremen-
dous hardship on accused persons. Stripped of all or major portions of
his financial resources, an accused (unless in detention) may be unable
to provide for the basic necessities of life and whether or not in deten-
tion, to provide for the preparation of his legal defense.'
3 '
122 Id at 728 ("Relief not obtained prior to the commencement of the criminal trial will not be
helpful in securing the assistance of counsel of choice at criminal trial.")
123 Id.
124 I at 729.
125 Id
126 IM.
127 Id at 731.
128 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1987).
129 Id at 928 (citing Crozier, 777 F.2d at 1383-84; Lewis, 759 F.2d at 1324-25; and Long, 654 F.2d
at 915).
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The court concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation is substantial
in this type of case.13 2
As for the government's interest, the court suggested that it is no
different in the pre-indictment setting as opposed to the post-indictment
setting. 133 The court stated: "No reason appears why the government
would be unduly burdened or any public interest disserved by providing
the same sort of immediate post-deprivation hearing in the post-indict-
ment setting as is required in the pre-indictment setting by Section 853
or as is contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65."134 The court ruled that the
indictment itself suffices as adequate notice and as sufficient justification
for entering a restraining order ex parte.13 5 But, according to the Harvey
court, a criminal trial, held as many as three months after the issuance of
a restraining order, fails to provide a hearing on that order within the
meaningful time required by due process.13 6 The court held that to the
extent the post-indictment restraining order provision authorizes the is-
suance of an ex parte restraining order without any post-deprivation hear-
ing other than the criminal trial, it violates the fifth amendment's due
process guarantees.13 7 (In Harvey, however, the court found the lack of a
post-deprivation hearing to be a harmless error because the conviction
stood and the forfeiture with it).
E. Synthesis
Certain principles can be drawn from these cases. First, there is no
real disagreement that due process in these cases allowed a restraint
before any hearing. Second, there is disagreement as to whether a hear-
ing is required later. Third, there is uncertainty as to the standard to be
applied at the hearing. Fourth, there is implicit agreement that the pur-
pose of the hearing, if and when it is held, would be to determine primar-
ily (1) whether the government was likely to succeed, and (2) whether the
property was forfeitable.
As to the government's likelihood of success, government agencies
in civil cases get ex parte restraining orders against property every day
with far less evidence than a grand jury must have put before it and far
less than what must be specified to describe the charge in a RICO indict-




135 Id. (citing United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, at 1469 (5th Cir. 1986)).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") can obtain preliminary in-
junctive relief without a showing of irreparable injury if the evidence establishes a strong prima facie
case of previous violations of securities laws and a reasonable likelihood that such wrongs will be
repeated. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963); see also SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Scott, 565 F. Supp. 1513,
1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd sub nom., SEC v. Cayman Islands Reinsurance Corp., 734 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1984). One of the most common forms of ancillary relief available to the SEC in enforcement
actions is disgorgement. See e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1053 (1985); SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985); SEC v. Manor Nursing Center, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). In order to preserve the remedy of disgorgement, the SEC often seeks
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tion.' s9 The indictment itself satisfies due process by giving an accused a
post-restraint opportunity to present any evidence to the contrary. As to
whether the property is forfeitable, there may sometimes be genuine
questions as to forfeitability of specific assets. A post-restraint hearing on
this issue at which a defendant can carry a burden of going forward by
showing reason to believe that certain property is not forfeitable, con-
trary to what the grand jury has found probable cause to believe, seems
to satisfy due process. 140
All of the cases have arisen with respect to whether or not the gov-
ernment has a right to take property at all. They have not arisen with
respect to the reasonableness of the kind of restraint employed. This arti-
cle will turn to the facts of the Princeton/Newport case to examine that
question.
III. The Princeton/Newport Case
Princeton/Newport Partners L.P. and a number of associated enti-
ties (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Princeton/Newport") in-
vested money both for its general partners and employees, and for a
number of limited partners for whom Princeton/Newport managed
money. The partnership had 80 employees who managed more than $1
billion in partnership investments.1 4 1 The partnership primarily en-
gaged in anomaly arbitrage, the buying and selling of securities based on
mathematical models that identify market anomalies.
14 2
The government obtained information from a former employee in
the fall of 1987 that Princeton/Newport was also engaged in some unsa-
vory activities. Information about ongoing tax fraud, securities fraud and
stock manipulation led to the issuance and execution of a search warrant
in December of 1987. The search uncovered tape recorded conversations
in which Princeton/Newport general partners and high-ranking employ-
ees committed these crimes with employees of Drexel Burnham Lambert
and others.
This information led to an indictment on August 4, 1988 charging
the five highest-ranking Princeton/Newport employees, along with one
employee of Drexel Burham Lambert, with mail fraud, wire fraud, con-
spiracy and racketeering. The indictment alleged that Princeton/New-
port had a relationship with Drexel Burnham Lambert in which
Princeton/Newport "parked" securities at Drexel (pretended to sell
them to Drexel) for the purpose of creating bogus tax losses in order to
defraud both the government and their own limited partners. In return,
the indictment alleged, Princeton/Newport agreed to do favors for
freeze orders to ensure that if the SEC succeeds on the merits, the profits will be available to satisfy
disgorgement orders. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1106 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Cannistraro, 694 F. Supp. 62, 71 (D.NJ. 1988), modified, 871 F.2d 1210 (3d
Cir. 1989); SEC v. Vaskevitch, 657 F. Supp. 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
139 It may, of course, have the useful purpose of getting discovery of the government's case be-
yond that allowed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
140 See generally Note, Due Process Implication of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings
Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DuxE LJ. 822.
141 Brief for Appellants at 7, United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988).
142 United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 120 (2nd Cir. 1988).
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Drexel Burnham Lambert which included the manipulation of stock. The
Princeton/Newport entity was not itself made a defendant, but was
named as the enterprise through which the named defendants conducted
and conspired to conduct their criminal activity.
The indictments sought the forfeiture not only of the proceeds of
the racketeering activity, including salaries, but also the interests of the
defendants in the enterprise. Since Princeton/Newport was a partner-
ship, the interest of the defendants consisted, among other things, of
their partnership interests, amounting to about 20% of the value of the
company. Consequently, Princeton/Newport's assets under manage-
ment totaled approximately $1 billion, its net assets were around $300
million, and the government could hope to forfeit no more than approxi-
mately $50 million.
Princeton/Newport was also a very active business. Because its legit-
imate activities consisted of taking advantage of small anomalies (or price
differences) between different markets for securities, the partnership en-
gaged in a large number of transactions in order to make small amounts
of money on each one. In the past, the firm had been involved in as
much as one percent of all trades in one day on the New York Stock
Exchange.
The government concluded that it could only be assured that money
would remain for payment of the forfeiture after trial if it obtained a
bond or restraining order on some of the assets of Princeton/Newport
up to some percentage of the possible forfeiture amount. The reasons
why the government sought to convince the court of the need for such a
bond or order were twofold. First, immediately after the search described
above, the Princeton/Newport defendants had withdrawn $15 million of
their stake in the enterprise. Shortly after that, part of the money was put
back into the business in their wives' names. Second, Princeton/New-
port was the kind of business in which millions of dollars could be sent to
Japan or Switzerland by wire in an instant. Princeton/Newport was in
constant communication with a number of overseas clients and financial
institutions and did in fact transfer such sums of money on a continuous
basis.
Because Princeton/Newport was not a car carrying drugs, or a piece
of land, or a bank account, but rather a complex, ongoing business, only
part of which was forfeitable, the restraining order had to be carefully
drawn. Moreover, the government would have been content with a bond
in the appropriate amount.
In these circumstances, to have simply gone ex parte to the district
court to ask for the order, as allowed by the RICO statute, seemed irre-
sponsible. Instead, after drafting a restraining order which by its terms
would allow the continuation of all normal business activities at
Princeton/Newport, but would forbid it to transfer funds other than as
part of its ordinary business, the government notified defense counsel
after return of the indictment that it would go before the district court to
seek the ex parte restraining order allowed by the statute unless a bond
were posted. The government also notified the district court that it
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would be presenting such an order, and that the government foresaw the
heed for a quick hearing on the reasonableness of the restraint thereafter
in view of the complex nature of the business involved.
As a result of these disclosures, the district court determined to hold
an adversary hearing before signing any order. The hearing lasted for
seven hours ending at 2:00 a.m. on the night following the return of the
indictment. The hearing did not focus on whether the government had
shown a probability of success on the merits. The specificity of the indict-
ment, which quoted from tape-recorded criminal conversations obtained
during the search, made a hearing on this issue pointless. Nor did the
hearing focus on whether the property alleged in the indictment was for-
feitable. The indictment simply tracked the statutory language involving
proceeds in the racketeering activity and interests of the defendants in
the enterprise, so while the amounts were debatable, the forfeitability of
the generic categories named in the indictment was not. Rather, the
hearing revolved almost entirely around the practical effect of the order
on the business of the unindicted entity, Princeton/Newport. 143 Corpo-
rate lawyers from Princeton/Newport appeared and at the district court's
request, negotiations were undertaken regarding ways in which the order
could be altered to ensure that the business would continue to operate,
without lenders and trading partners shying away from doing business
with Princeton/Newport because of some erroneous fear that its assets
were irrevocably and completely frozen.'4
The order in its final form was considerably altered to meet objec-
tions and fears of counsel for the Princeton/Newport entity.' 45 Finally,
the district court found that the restraining order as altered would not
harm the business beyond the harm inherent in a criminal indictment of
its principals and signed the order. The following day, after hearing addi-
tional proffers of testimony and argument for the better part of another
day, the district court adhered to its decision.
On interlocutory appeal from the district court's order, the type or
timing of hearing required by the RICO statute was not an issue because
a full pre-seizure hearing had in fact been held. The Second Circuit up-
held the government's ability to put a restraint of this type on a non-
party business entity part of which might be forfeitable, and to require a
monitor selected by the government and paid for by the entity who
would ensure compliance with the order. The court pointed out that this
was "strong medicine" which should be avoided in the event that a bond
could be posted.' 46 On remand, after argument over the amount of the
bond, a bond was in fact posted.'
47
These facts raise the question of what process is due to an operating
entity like Princeton/Newport, whether or not it is a defendant in the
case, with respect to the reasonableness of the restraint which the Second
143 Record at 11, Regan (88 Cr. 517 (RLC)).
144 See iaL at 118-21.
145 See United States v. Regan, 88 Cr. 517 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y Aug. 5, 1988) (order granting post-
indictment restraining order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(A) (1988)).
146 United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d at 121.
147 United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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Circuit ruled in United States v. Regan could be imposed. Is a post-seizure
hearing good enough or is a pre-seizure hearing required, and in either
case what are the issues to be determined at such a hearing and under
what standard? Whatever the answers to these questions, the facts de-
scribed above suggest that Princeton/Newport did indeed get due pro-
cess before a restraining order was entered in that case, but there was
neither a theory nor a practice supporting that result. The statute clearly
requires no hearing whatever. Prior cases had all involved post-forfeiture
hearings, and had only concerned the black or white issue of whether or
not specific property was forfeitable, rather than the reasonableness of
the type of restraint to be imposed.
IV. Due Process and the Operating Business Entity
There can be no question that a pre-judgment restraining order
even of the partial type used in Princeton/Newport, is a deprivation of
property in a constitutional sense.1 48 The important area of focus is what
kind of process and hearing is due, and when is it due. Applying the
three-part Fuentes test in the case of the ordinary RICO forfeiture indict-
ment, due process requires that (1) the government have a compelling
interest in preventing continued illicit use of property, in obtaining full
recovery of all forfeitable assets, and in enforcing the criminal law;149 (2)
quick action is warranted to prevent the dissipation of assets subject to
forfeiture and the ensuing frustration of the forfeiture provisions;150 and
(3) the restraint of property in RICO is sought by government officials
responsible for determining that such restraint is appropriate in the par-
ticular instance.15' All of these factors support the existence of ex-
traordinary circumstances in the context of the ordinary RICO post-
indictment setting. In such a case, postponement of a hearing of any kind
until after the restraint is in place is warranted.152 For example, in United
States v. Chinn,' 53 a hearing held three weeks after a restraining order
application was granted, at which the court modified the order to allow
for business and living expenses of the defendant, was deemed
appropriate.15
4
The calculus is different when the property sought to be restrained
is an operating business entity. The government interest is still strong,
148 United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 1988) ("While the restraining
order does not divest definitively the ownership rights of the defendant, it certainly does remove
those assets from his immediate control and therefore divest him of a significant property interest.").
149 Spilotro, 680 F.2d at 617; see Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2546, 2556 (1989).
150 See supra note 149.
151 See supra note 149.
152 Of course, in the context of a pre-indictment setting, the postponement of a hearing would
not comport with due process. Congress recognized this, and provided specific procedures requir-
ing notice and an opportunity for a hearing to be given to all persons appearing to have an interest
in the property. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(l)(B) (Supp. 1990). See text accompanying notes 49-50.
153 687 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Chinn, the court granted the government's restraining
order on the same day as the indictment issued. Defendant had transferred assets to his wife after he
learned that he was a target of the "Wedtech" investigation. The court also released some of the
frozen assets which had been purchased prior to defendant's involvement with Wedtech because
they were not covered by Section 1963(d).
154 I at 126.
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though not as strong when only part of the entity is forfeitable, but the
need for quick action and indeed the effect of quick action on the govern-
ment's interest may be quite different.
An operating entity is an organism. If its operations are jolted too
severely, it may stop working entirely. This can be seen most easily if the
restraint imposed is a freeze on accounts and activities of the entity. Even
if the restraint is intended to allow continued business, however, it may
inadvertently cause suppliers or creditors to stop dealing with the entity.
For example, there may be misunderstanding as the type or degree of
restraints, which causes fear that repayment of obligations will be forbid-
den. If the government's ultimate aim is to gain possession of the entire
entity, a sudden cessation of business by an operating business entity is
very likely to lessen or destroy the value of that entity as a going concern
and thus injure the government's interest. This is particularly true of
such industries as financial services or securities trading, which depend
on extensions of credit and the confidence of contrary parties in transac-
tions. If investors pull out, if lenders will no longer lend, and if other
participants in the securities markets refuse to trade with an entity, the
entity quickly loses the ability to function. This is one of the many lessons
in the demise of Drexel Burnham Lambert.155 If the government wants
to forfeit the entity or parts thereof, such a demise is not in its interest
because the value of the entity will decrease, to say nothing of the inter-
est of the entity itself. Moreover, if only part of the entity is possibly for-
feitable, as in Princeton/Newport, the strength of the government's interest
is correspondingly lessened.
Whether the entity is a defendant or, like Princeton/Newport, a non-
party repository of forfeitable assets, is not relevant to this analysis. The
government's interest is in maintaining the availability of assets until for-
feitability is determined by judgment. It has no additional interest if the
entity is a defendant, except to an appropriate punishment upon convic-
tion. Such an interest does not exist before judgment.
This analysis suggests that when property sought to be forfeited is
from an operating business entity the affected entity should be given an
opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the restraint before it
takes effect. Since the Fuentes test is not met in such circumstances by a
post-seizure hearing on the reasonableness of the restraint, only a pre-
seizure hearing will give the opportunity to be heard on that issue at a
meaningful time15 6 as due process requires.
157
Due process also requires that the opportunity to be heard be mean-
ingful in manner.' 58 The issue here is the bounds of the opportunity to
be heard which will be afforded pre-seizure. In Mathews v. Eldridge,15 9 the
Supreme Court-enundated three factors to be balanced in order to iden-
tify "the specific dictates of due process": (1) the private interest affected;
155 United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 89 Cr. 41 (KMW). See Drexel, Symbol of Wall St.
Era, Is Dismantling: Bankruptcy Filed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at Al, col. I.
156 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-92. Armstrong, 480 U.S. at 552.
157 See text accompanying notes 9-14.
158 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-92. See Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552; text accompanying notes 15-17.
159 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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(2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safe-
guards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens an additional proce-
dural requirement would entail.1 60 These factors weigh in favor of al-
lowing an operating business entity to be heard pre-seizure on the issue
of the reasonableness of the restraint, though not on the issues of prob-
able cause or forfeitability.
First, the private interest is significant. The property interest of an
operating business entity is at stake when its assets are restrained. This is
even more true when only a portion of the assets are subject to forfei-
ture. If the government's restraint is overbroad or unreasonable, the risk
of putting such a company out of business is real. To delay a hearing
until after the restraint is in place even for a matter of days could so
stymie the operation of a business that it inadvertently could be
destroyed.
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is significant in the case of
an operating business entity. If the indictment identifies a percentage of
such a business as forfeitable, the government's restraint must be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the purpose of preserving the assets for forfei-
ture. Inadvertent over-restraint is a significant danger. Because due
process protects against arbitrary deprivations of property, 61 the de-
fendant should be afforded an immediate opportunity to be heard on the
reasonableness of the restraint on its property to protect from erroneous
deprivation of assets necessary to conducting its legitimate business. The
value of such an additional safeguard would not only serve the significant
private interest, but also the government's interest in keeping the legiti-
mate enterprise viable so that assets will be available for forfeiture upon
conviction. In addition, a pre-restraint hearing on the issue of reasona-
bleness would offer the opportunity for such an operating commercial
entity to post a performance bond in lieu of a restraint on its continuing
operation as suggested by the appeals court in Princeton/Newport. 62
As for the third factor, the government indeed has a strong counter-
vailing interest in preserving the assets subject to forfeiture. 163 The re-
quirement of some showing of reasonableness prior to restraint would
clearly be an additional burden on the government. Whether this burden
is sufficient to require temporary measures to secure the potentially for-
feitable property before a hearing, however, should depend on the facts.
If the property cannot readily be disposed of, a pre-seizure hearing
should typically be required by due process. For example, if the property
is a personal residence, and a simple property law device like a lis pendens
can cloud its title preventing any sale, due process requires a full hearing
before any seizure. 164 However, if the situation is similar to Princeton/
160 Id. at 335.
161 Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552.
162 Regan, 858 F.2d at 122.
163 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
164 Perholtz, 662 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 (D.D.C. 1985); United States v. Serafine, 889 F.2d 1258 (2d
Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (1990).
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Newport, where the property was readily transportable, but in which there
was sufficient value in excess of the forfeitable amount and to make com-
plete disposal required a matter of days and not of hours, a pre-seizure
hearing on reasonableness held on the day of indictment should be suffi-
dent to protect the government's interest. Other situations could be
imagined involving smaller amounts of forfeitable assets which could be
instantly hidden and plans designed to hide them, which would justify
restraints before any hearing.
Generally, in the case of an operating business entity, if an opportu-
nity to be heard on the question of reasonableness is given to the defend-
ant at the same time that the government seeks the restraint, the burden
on the government would not be undue. A delayed hearing changes the
calculus and favors imposing some restraint temporarily. The calculus is
different as to hearings on the issues of probable cause and forfeitability
which, on this analysis, should wait until after seizure, as the private in-
terest is lessened if the safeguards imposed have been tested for reasona-
bleness, and the government's interests are greater.1 65
Thus, in the case of an indictment against an operating business en-
tity in which a percentage of the entity's assets are sought for forfeiture,
the three factors enunciated by the Supreme Court should generally
mandate giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard on the reason-
ableness of the restraint sought. In order to provide that opportunity at a
meaningful time, the hearing should generally be required prior to the
issuance of the restraining order so that the normal, legitimate business
activities of the defendant will not be disrupted unnecessarily. But in or-
der to protect the government's interest, that hearing must occur imme-
diately and only on the issue of the reasonableness of the restraint. After
the restraint is in place, the two questions of the likelihood of the govern-
ment's success and whether the property is forfeitable may be addressed
at a subsequent hearing. This fact-based balancing of interests accords
with the fact-specific way in which due process jurisprudence has
evolved. Due process is a flexible concept, requiring an analysis of the
facts particular to each case in determining the form of the procedures
necessary to comport with constitutional dictates.'
66
V. Conclusion
Pre-judgment restraints on property are always "strong
medicine"' 67 not to be imposed except when necessary and to the extent
necessary to protect important interests. Restraints without a hearing are
stronger medicine still. In the case of an operating business entity such
restraints may be a kind of overenthusiastic chemotherapy that kills the
patient in order to save it. Yet RICO violations are serious, and the im-
portance of maintaining property subject to forfeiture within reach of
govenment is undeniable. One lesson of Princeton/Newport is that the
165 See supra text accompanying notes 91-110.
166 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1974); see also supra notes 6-16. See generally K. DAvis,
ADMINISTATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.0 (Supp. 1982).
167 Regan, 858 F.2d at 121.
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case of an operating business entity a pre-seizure hearing solely on the
issue of the reasonableness of the restraint is consistent with protection
of the government's interest, and indeed may be important to protection
of that interest. Because of this factual predicate, due process in these
circumstances requires a pre-seizure hearing of the dimensions outlined
above.
